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ABSTRACT
APPLYING FRANCES FOWLER’S MODEL TO ANALYZE THE HISTORY
OF COMPULSORY ATTENDANCE LAWS
IN THE UNITED STATES

Deborah Dyer Osborne, EdD,
Department of Leadership, Educational Psychology and Foundations
Northern Illinois University, 2015
Dr. Jon Crawford and Dr. Christine Kiracofe, Co-Directors

The notion of compelling formal education has been in existence since the
1600’s. Subtle differences can be extrapolated from the compulsory school
attendance statutes enacted during the past four centuries; however, the core
requirements have remained the same. Despite the fact the United States
Supreme Court has ruled education is not a fundamental right. Every state has
laws mandating school attendance for minor children. For centuries, judicial
efforts have wrestled with crafting effective interventions and punishments for
students and parents failing to follow these laws. Sadly, truancy continues to be a
plague in 21st century education. There continues to be financial ramifications for
families, districts, and communities for non-attendance.

The unfortunate

repetitions of history and the continuation of the negative consequences for truant
minors, begs the educational, legislative, and judicial systems to reevaluate, and
possibly reframe the questions surrounding compulsory school attendance.

This study historically examines legislative enactments and judicial
decisions that have affected compulsory school attendance and compulsory
education through four distinct eras, utilizing Frances Fowler’s theoretical
perspectives as a lens. Each of Fowler’s eras carried its own social, economic,
political, and cultural values. Reflections on the trends and values of historical
legal decisions related to compulsory school attendance are explored as both a
predictor and the basis for recommendations. This study frames meaningful
questions that may help open a long overdue compulsory school attendance
dialogue.
Data was collected through historical and contemporary reviews of both
case law and law review articles relevant to compulsory school attendance. This
study focused on federal and Illinois case law related to compulsory school
attendance. The majority of cases presented are from United States Supreme
Court, United States Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal, United States Federal
District Courts, Illinois Supreme Court, and Illinois lower state courts.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Background

Truancy rates for public school students in the state of Illinois are staggering. The
2013-2014 end-of-year report from the Illinois State Board of Education, based on data from
78.8% of Illinois school districts, revealed 725,823 students in Illinois were truant during the
year, an increase of 80,787 truants from the 2008-2009 end-of-year report.1 The attempted
enforcement of compulsory school attendance mandates creates a financial burden on school
districts and judicial entities already struggling in these harsh economic times. As evidenced
by the figures above, the current strategies to enforce Illinois compulsory attendance laws
have, to date, been unsuccessful. Despite this fact, Illinois passed legislation, effective July 1,
2014, lowering the age requirement for compulsory school attendance to six years old, further
taxing an already-stressed system.2
The first American compulsory education laws can be traced back to 1647. These
early laws focused on the need for children to adopt religious and moral principles. Despite
the fact that support and enforcement of these laws waned in subsequent centuries, by 1918
1

http://isbe.net/research/htmls/eoy_report.htm

2

Illinois School Code, 105 ILCS 5/26-1 (2014).

2
compulsory school attendance laws had been enacted in every state in the union.3 These laws
were generally similar, containing differences only in detail. Early compulsory attendance
laws commonly contained the following: minimum and maximum age requirements, legal
obligations for parents, penalties, and lists of exempted classes.4 Proponents’ arguments for
the enactment of these laws ranged from employment preparation and economic success to
the development of citizenship and character traits. Opposition to school compulsion focused
on the prospects of prolonged adolescence, higher discipline issues in high school, and limited
innovation.5 These laws usually reflected the social situation and ideology at the time of
enactment.6

Statement of the Problem

During the time of America’s birth, Thomas Jefferson highlighted the critical
connection between an educated citizenry and a secure democracy.7 It was thought educated
3

M. S. Katz, A History of Compulsory Education Laws 18 (The Phi Delta Kappa Educational Foundation, 1976).

4

Charles K. Woltz, Compulsory Attendance at School, 20 Law and Contemporary Problems in School Pupils
and the Law, 7 (1955). http://www.jstor.org/stable/1190271 (last visited Feb. 20, 2015).
5

StateUniversity.com, Compulsory School Attendance-Development of Compulsory School Attendance
Philosophy and laws, Exemptions and Alternatives, Issues Associated with Compulsory Attendance,
http://education.stateuniversity.com/pages/1878/Compulsory-School-Attendance. html (last visited Feb. 20,
2015).
6

7

Francis C Fowler., Policy Studies for Educational Leaders: An Introduction 46 (4th ed. 2013).

Susan H. Bitensky, Legal Theory: Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education under the U.S.
Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 Nw. U .L. Rev. 550 (1992).

3
citizens would be capable of making informed voting decisions.8 Horace Mann, the first
Superintendent of Massachusetts Schools, echoed Jefferson’s beliefs. He was firmly
committed to the notion that the purpose of public schools was to train children to be good
citizens by instilling American values.9 Compulsory attendance laws, coupled with the
substantial financial investment in education, suggest an educated citizenry is still a current
priority.
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the
importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in
the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today
it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to
adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that
any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied
the opportunity of an education.10
Despite the fact the United States Supreme Court has ruled education is not a fundamental
right, afforded protection under the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment,11 every state
has laws mandating school attendance for minor children.12 In 1955, Charles Woltz wrote,

8

“Thomas Jefferson pointed out early in our history that some degree of education is necessary to prepare
citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and
independence.” Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 221 (1972).
9

Stephen L. Carter, Article: Oliver Wendell Holmes Lecture: Parents, Religion, and Schools: Reflections on
Pierce, 70 Years Later, 27 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1194, 1196 (1997).
10

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 ,493 (1954).

11

San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).

12

“Under the tenth amendment, powers not specifically delegated to the federal government or specifically
prohibited to the states by the Constitution are reserved to the states. Thus public education became a function
that was reserved to the states, and over the years since 1791, education has been and now is essentially a state

4
“The constitutionality of these laws has been frequently assailed. Yet no court in this country
has held it beyond the authority of the state to require that children be exposed to a certain
amount of instruction, nor has any court denied the power of the state to make reasonable
provision as to the type, means, and supervision of such instruction. Thus the basic principles
of compulsory education are as firmly supported by legal precedents as by public opinion.”13
Historically, courts have been asked to consider the interests of the state, parent, and
child when ruling on compulsory school attendance challenges. Judicial efforts have wrestled
with crafting effective interventions and punishments for students and parents failing to
follow these laws. Laws and punishments dating as far back as the 1600’s have been repeated
and reconfigured for almost four centuries. As early as 1647, towns with more than 50
households were asked to appoint a select group to oversee the education of students. Fines
were levied against families who failed to comply. However, the complex laws enacted prior
to the 1900’s were generally ineffective.14 Sadly, truancy continues to be a plague in 21st century education. There continue to be financial ramifications for families, districts, and
communities for non-attendance. Additionally, a tremendous amount of judicial energy
continues to be spent addressing issues related to truancy. Cities, counties, and states have
enacted countless ordinances and laws and expended tremendous resources to combat truant
behavior. Yet the struggle continues. The unfortunate repetition of history and the
continuation of the negative consequences for truant minors beg the educational and judicial
responsibility.” Faustine C. Jones-Wilson, Education and the Constitution: The Constitution and Universal
Education: What Might Have Been, 1987 How. L.J. 813 (1987).
13

Woltz, supra note 4, at 7.

14

Katz, supra note 3, at 19.
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systems to reevaluate, and possibly reframe, the questions that have been asked for so long. Is
it possible compulsory attendance laws are the issue? Is the public opinion support referenced
by Charles Woltz in 1955 still relevant? In 1973, Howard Johnson, associate director, Bureau
of School Service and Research, suggested compulsory attendance laws were outdated.15
Since the 1600’s, communities have been expending their energy developing creative
enforcement solutions. The United States is at risk of simply repeating history. An in-depth
look at compulsory attendance laws and their corresponding educational environments may
hold an answer that will offer a positive solution to the crisis for the United States’ education
system, legal system, and its citizenry.

Significance of the Study

The examination of compulsory attendance through four distinct eras, utilizing
Frances Fowler’s four theoretical perspectives as a lens, will add to the current literature. The
reflection on the trends and values of historical legal decisions related to compulsory school
attendance as both a predictor and the basis for recommendations for the future is a unique
approach to the topic. Countless judicial efforts to address truancy can be highlighted
throughout history. Few of these judicial responses, however, focus on the predecessor to
truancy, namely the compulsory school attendance laws. A historical analysis of compulsory
school attendance laws may help legislators and educational leaders positively impact the
educational environment.

15

Howard M. Johnson, Are Compulsory Attendance Laws Outdated?, in The Phi Delta Kappan 55, No. 4
(1973).

6
Research Questions

This study investigated the following questions:
1. What is the relevant legal history of compulsory school attendance in the United
States?
2. What is the status of current compulsory school attendance laws?
3. How can a historical review of laws, interventions, and effectiveness inform future
compulsory school attendance legislation?
4. Can an examination of compulsory school attendance judicial decisions in their
historical context and through the lens of the Frances Fowler’s four theoretical
perspectives (competing values perspective, Lowi’s policy types perspective,
institutional choice perspective and international convergence perspective) glean
beneficial insight into trends and future policy recommendations?

Delimitations of the Study

This study historically examines judicial decisions that have affected compulsory
school attendance and compulsory education laws during the four eras described by Frances
Fowler, a scholar of the politics of education.16 Frances Fowler’s education policy studies
will provide the theoretical frameworks for a policy environment study as it relates to
compulsory school attendance. Data was collected through historical and contemporary
reviews of both case law and law review articles relevant to compulsory school attendance.
The majority of cases presented are from the United States Supreme Court, United States
16

Fowler, supra note 6, at 46.

7
Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal, United States Federal District Courts, Illinois Supreme
Court, and Illinois lower state courts. This study focused on federal and Illinois case law
related to compulsory school attendance. While all states have compulsory school attendance
laws, the scope of this study has been narrowed to allow for a more in-depth examination of
the topic. The contemporary legal analysis focused on the state of Illinois.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

In order to enable public schools to effectively address issues related to compulsory
school attendance, an examination of the history of legislation and the policy environment
during the eras in which these decisions were reached is needed. Analyzing the evolution of
compulsory attendance laws using Fowler’s four theoretical perspectives as a lens provides
greater understanding of the social setting of legal decisions. As Fowler explains:
Every public policy, including every education policy, is a response to a
specific social setting that includes a wide range of phenomena studied by the
social sciences: economic forces, demographic trends, ideological belief
systems, deeply held values, the structure and traditions of the political
system and the culture of the broader society. Although these phenomena
change over time, most of them also reveal historical continuity.1
Frances Fowler offers four theoretical frameworks (i.e., competing values perspective, Lowi’s
policy types perspective, institutional choice perspective and international convergence
perspective) in which these phenomena are examined in each of four eras (Young Republic,
Rise of the Common Schools, Scientific Sorting Machine, and New Paradigm). The
competing values perspective provides a framework for examining social, democratic, and
economic values, while Lowi’s policy types perspective provides a framework for examining
1

Id. at 46.

9
political environments through an analysis of policy types (distributive, regulatory, and
redistributive). 2 The institutional choice perspective provides a framework to examine
systems by their reflection of institution types: bureaucracy, legalization, professionalization,
politics, and market.3 The international convergence perspective is a framework to examine
the increasing similarities in school systems around the world. Briefly summarizing the eras
utilizing the aforementioned perspectives, the Young Republic era was characterized by
individualism, isolation, and uninvolved government. The Rise of the Common Schools era
shifted away from individualism to fraternity, order, uniformity through regulation, and focus
on economic growth. Increased bureaucracy and international influence were prevalent. The
Scientific Sorting Machine era stressed efficiency, equality, and resource redistribution.
Education legislation increased, with international influence evident. The New Paradigm era
focused on excellence, systems, and their related elements.
However, before the Young Republic era, “the first American law establishing
education as a state function was passed in 1647.”4 The Old Deluder, Satan Law5 was created
to halt the “chief project of old deluder, Satan,”6 from interfering with men reading Scripture

2

Id. at 301.

3

Id. at 302.

4

Molly Townes O’Brien, Private School Tuition Vouchers and the Realities of Racial Politics 64 Tenn. L. Rev.
359, 370 n58 (1997), citing Harl R. Douglas & Calvin Grieder, American Public Education: An Introduction 14
(1948).
5

The Old Deluder Act (1647), in 2 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND 203 (Nathaniel B. Shurtleff ed., Boston, William White 1853),
available at http://personal.pitnet.net/primarysources/deluder.html.
6

The Old Deluder Act (1647), in 2 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND 203 (Nathaniel B. Shurtleff ed., Boston, William White 1853),
available at http://personal.pitnet.net/primarysources/deluder.html.

10
and exposing men to deceivers. It provided “that every Township in this Jurisdiction, af [sic]
the Lord hath increased them to the number of fifty Householders, shall then forthwith
appoint one within their town to teach all such children as shall resort to him [sic] to write
and read.”7 The wages for the teacher were to be paid by the parents or guardians of the
children.8 If the towns increased to 100 households, the law mandated the establishment of a
“Grammar School, the Masters there of being able to instruct youth so far as they may be
fitted for the Universitite.”9 If the town failed to implement the laws, they were fined five
pounds per year.10 Prior to this enactment, the populace viewed the education of children to
be a moral obligation. However, the action of these elders transformed education into a legal
obligation. The law established a select group of individuals whose sole function was to
identify neglectful parents and report them to the court. While The Old Deluder, Satan Law
was enacted prior to the Young Republic era, the policy environment during these early years,

7

The Old Deluder Act (1647), in 2 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND 203 (Nathaniel B. Shurtleff ed., Boston, William White 1853),
available at http://personal.pitnet.net/primarysources/deluder.html.
8

The Old Deluder Act (1647), in 2 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND 203 (Nathaniel B. Shurtleff ed., Boston, William White 1853),
available at http://personal.pitnet.net/primarysources/deluder.html.
9

The Old Deluder Act (1647), in 2 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND 203 (Nathaniel B. Shurtleff ed., Boston, William White 1853),
available at http://personal.pitnet.net/primarysources/deluder.html.
10

The Old Deluder Act (1647), in 2 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND 203 (Nathaniel B. Shurtleff ed., Boston, William White 1853),
available at http://personal.pitnet.net/primarysources/deluder.html.
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examined through the lens of the four theoretical perspectives, is similar. Despite numerous
revisions to the law, it was ineffectively enforced.11

Young Republic Era (1783-1830)
During the “Young Republic” years, Fowler describes individualism and freedom as
the foundational values for education policy.12 The distrust that emerged during the late
Colonial Period and Revolutionary War continued to fester. The primary focus of attention
during these years was establishing a viable nation. Efforts to develop a strong economy,
create political institutions, and resolve conflicts of the former colonies were paramount.13
Among the most challenging differences between the former colonies were the varied
attitudes related to education. Government neither encouraged nor discouraged education,
evidenced by the omission of the word “education” in the United States Constitution.14
Government inaction prevailed. States were granted sole authority to direct education within
their borders. Citizenry began to increasingly desire literacy skills for themselves and their
children. Diverse education environments existed during this era. Informal home schools,
private-venture schools,15 and semi-public schools could be found within the confines of one

11

M. S. Katz, A History of Compulsory Education Laws 13 (The Phi Delta Kappa Educational Foundation,
1976).
12

Francis C. Fowler, Policy Studies for Educational Leaders: An Introduction 304 (4th ed. 2013).

13

Id. at 303.

14

Id.

15

Private-venture schools focused on the mastery of single-subject skills, such as handwriting. Id.

12
state.16 Although not widely pursued, opportunities to enhance education beyond the basic
level were available privately and publicly with parental financial backing. The market was
the institutional form, whereby schooling was a local business venture.17 Parents wanted to
control the education for their children and preferred to have multiple local schools available
to them.
Throughout early American history, however, there was no “system” of public
schooling in place. Schools were primarily established by various religious denominations.
Beginning in the early 1800’s, industries and cities began to grow throughout America.
Immigrants began to arrive in significantly large numbers.18 The influx of diverse immigrant
populations into cities created chaotic conditions and accentuated the separation of classes.
The educational services provided to the populace were grossly uneven. By the mid 1800’s,
the populace was calling for the establishment of common schools. 19 It was at this time that
Horace Mann began his campaign for the establishment of free public schooling in the United
States.20 While no judicial decisions significant to this study were decided during this era,
education did emerge as an important consideration for American citizenry.

16

17

Id.
Id. at 304.

18

Katz, supra note11, at 14.

19

Id. at 14.

20

Id. at 15.

13
The Rise of the Common Schools (1831-1900)
Fowler refers to the years 1831 to 1900 as “The Rise of the Common Schools.”21 This
era illustrates a shift in education policy when viewed through the lens of each of the four
frameworks.

The rapid changes in the United States brought on by industrialization

significantly impacted education policy. The dramatic influx of farmers, immigrants, and
Catholics to a primarily Protestant populace created a litany of issues, including a dramatic
increase in crime, which were ultimately addressed through reform movements.22 The taxsupported Common School movement, led by Horace Mann, sought to reform American
education with the hope this reformation would unify the populace and decrease crime.23 By
1860, the Common School described by Horace Mann was widespread in the North and
slowly emerging in the South.24 Individualistic values were replaced with Common School
values of fraternity, order, and economic growth.25 The desire for a national sense of unity
(fraternity) sprang from the fear of separation based on the religious, ethnic, and social
differences. This fear was realized, for example, when conflict broke out between people of
different religions.26 The Common School movement was viewed as a way to restore order to
a conflicted nation. Additionally, the Common School sought to grow the economy by
21

Fowler, supra note 12, at 306.

22

Id.

23

Id.

24

Id. at 307.

25

Id.

26

Catholics and Protestants battled each other during the 1837 Boston riots. Id.

14
augmenting the work force with hardworking workers who possessed basic academic skills.27
Government pursued social uniformity, rather than individualism, through the regulation of
education. Compulsory school attendance is one example of this regulation.28 Longer school
year, graded schools, the establishment of state and local education agencies and leaders and
teacher professional development are additional examples of the Common School movement
goals.29 While there had been no attempts at international sharing of educational ideas prior
to the industrialization age, worry about economic competition from other parts of the world
contributed to a shift away from a strictly American education system toward a system that
reflected international norms. 30 Education legislation and subsequent judicial challenges
began to emerge during this era.

Massachusetts Compulsory Attendance Act of 1852
In 1852, Massachusetts passed the nation’s first compulsory school attendance law,
requiring parents to send their children to a public school in their town for a minimum of 12
weeks, at least six of which needed to be consecutive weeks.31 The idea behind the law was
that the state needed to correct parental failures and protect children from both themselves and

27

Id.

28

Id.

29

Id. at 306.

30

Id. at 309.

31

Massachusetts Compulsory Attendance Act of 1852 available at www.intellectualtakeout.org/library/primarysources/massachusetts-compulsory-attendance-statutes-1852-1913 (last visited Feb. 20, 2015).
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neglectful parents.32 Additionally, the law was initially viewed as a way to curb child labor.33
Rather than working for a wage, children would be required to attend school to further their
education. As with earlier laws, the law of 1852 was rarely enforced.34
Illinois Compulsory Attendance Law35
In 1883, the Illinois legislature passed the state’s first compulsory attendance statute.36
This law required children between the ages of eight to fourteen to attend school for at least
twelve weeks each year.37
In 1889, the compulsory school age was lowered to include seven-year-old children.38
The school year was also lengthened from twelve to sixteen weeks.39 In 2004, the age for
compulsory school attendance was increased to include seventeen-year-olds, in order to
positively impact graduation rates and better prepare students for a competitive world
market.40 With the passage of Public Act 98-544, the compulsory school attendance age is

32

The Honorable Jeremiah S. Jeremiah, Jr., Article: Truancy Court: A Child of the Juvenile Justice System, 49
RI Bar Jnl. 5, 5 (2000).
33

Lorenzo A. Trujillo, School Truancy: A Case Study of a Successful Truancy Reduction Model in the Public
Schools,10 UC Davis J. Juv. L. & Pol'y 69, 10 (2006).
34

Katz, supra note11, at 19.

35

105 ILCS 5/26 et seq. (2014).

36

105 ILCS 5/26-1 from ch. 122 par. 26-1.

37

105 ILCS 5/26-1 from ch. 122 par. 26-1

38

http://isbe.net/news/2004/Illinois_educaiton_timeline.pdf

39

http://isbe.net/news/2004/Illinois_educaiton_timeline.pdf

40

http://isbe.net/news/2004/Illinois_educaiton_timeline.pdf
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set to expand yet again in 2014 to include six-year-old children.41

This change is an effort to

combat truancy at the earliest grade. Supporters of the legislation argued increased school
attendance translated to increased opportunities for higher education and employment.
The Illinois School Code defines a truant as “a child subject to compulsory school
attendance and who is absent without valid cause from such attendance for a school day or
portion thereof.”42 A habitual truant must be absent, without a valid excuse, for 5% or more
of the past 180 school days.43 School districts define excused absence in their written
policies. Written or verbal absence explanations from parents or physicians are typically
considered a valid excuse for a student’s absence from school. The Illinois School Code sets
forth rules and definitions for “truant,” “valid cause,” “drop out” and “religion.” The law also
allows exemptions for students attending private schools, students with significant mental or
physical disabilities, students who are lawfully employed and enrolled in an alternative
learning opportunity, and students unable to attend particular days of the week or times of the
day for religious practices. The statute also sets forth the course of action for noncompliance, including truancy officer intervention, circuit court complaint, fines and/or
imprisonment.44 Both the Massachusetts Compulsory Attendance Act of 1852 and the
Illinois Compulsory Attendance Law are part of the foundation, created during the Rise of the

41

105 ILCS 5/26-1 from ch. 122 par. 26-2

42

105 ILCS 5/26-1 from ch. 122 par. 26-2a

43

105 ILCS 5/26-1 from ch. 122 par. 26-2a

44

105 ILCS 5/26-1 from ch. 122 par. 26-1 to16

17
Common School era, for an onslaught of legislation, challenges, and seminal court rulings
that would set the course of compulsory attendance firmly in place for the next century.

Scientific Sorting Machine (1900-1982)

It was not until 1918 that other states in the union began to replicate and enforce
compulsory school attendance laws similar to the laws created during the aforementioned
Rise of the Common Schools period.45 The influx of court decisions rendered between the
years 1900 to 1982 occurred during the “Scientific Sorting Machine” era described by
Fowler.46 These years, wrought with increased international tension, rises in immigration,
and the industrialization boom, reflect yet another shift in education policy.47 Competition
between the European nations escalated during the late nineteenth century. World War I,
World War II, and the Cold War further impacted the policy environments during this era.
In response to rampant local government corruption and explosive enrollment
increases in secondary schools, two key policy issues emerged: revamping the governing
structure of public education and dealing with expanding secondary school enrollment.48 The
face of education governance changed to include smaller, nonpartisan school boards;
expanded central office administration that included trained business management experts;

45

Katz, supra note 11, at 18.

46

Fowler, supra note 12, at 309.

47

Id.

48

Id.

18
and increased legal changes to deter corruptive practices. 49 Two proposals emerged to deal
with secondary enrollment: either a high school where all students completed the same
curriculum or a high school where a differentiated curriculum was offered to students. 50
Ultimately the latter became the face of education, with the secondary curriculum becoming
differentiated into “tracks.” A variety of policy mechanisms were put into place to support
the movement to differentiated curriculum: ability grouping, standardized achievement and
I.Q. testing, academic and vocational counseling, and establishment of junior high schools.51
The American education system’s movement to “tracks” was also a response to increased
international influence.52 This movement afforded educators the opportunity to sort children
based on educators’ perception of individual student capacity for schooling.

Children

perceived to possess an innate capacity to learn were tracked for higher education while
students deemed to be less academically able were tracked toward vocational endeavors.
Despite these reforms, the goal of equal education opportunity for students continued to be an
elusive pursuit. Racial, gender, social class, and disability gaps were evident as segregation
continued.53
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Efficiency and equality were the dominant values during this era. These values were
evident in the multiple rights movements of the 1960’s and 1970’s. 54

The focus of

redistributive education policy shifted from regular education to education of children
experiencing poverty, special needs, or limited English proficiency. 55 A tremendous increase
in the legalization of education occurred. The educational system reflected a strengthened
bureaucracy reliant upon experts and credentialed professionals.56

However, throughout this

era, despite vast changes to the public education system, a growing dissatisfaction with public
education swelled. 57 Parental authority to make educational decisions for their children
decreased to virtually no authority in a matter of decades. “There were two cases in the
1920’s that challenged the state’s right to have sole dominion over education, Meyer v. State
of Nebraska58 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters59.”60
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Meyer v. Nebraska61

In 1919, Nebraska enacted a statute forbidding the teaching of any language other than
English to children below eighth grade in all schools, both public and private.62 The statute’s
stated purpose was to facilitate assimilation of immigrants into American culture. The
legislators believed the best way to ensure public safety and the development of good
American citizens was to legislate that children must learn English and acquire American
ideas, without the intrusion of “foreign tongues.”63 Violation of the law was deemed a
misdemeanor, punishable by a fine up to $100 and up to thirty days in jail for each offense. 64
At the time of its creation, the enactment of this statute was thought to be within the powers of
the state.
Thereafter, a Zion Parochial School teacher was convicted of teaching German to a
10-year-old child. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s conviction,65
stating the statute did not conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
and was an appropriate expression of the state’s power.66 The constitutional issue presented
to the United States Supreme Court concerned a due process challenge based on the
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Fourteenth Amendment’s liberty interests.67,68 The United States Supreme Court recognized
the ability of the state to develop its own curriculum, including the teaching of the English
language, as well as the attendant authority to compel school attendance.69 The Court
appreciated the legislature’s desire to improve the quality of its citizenry and maintain a
homogeneous people. However, the Court held the ban on teaching foreign languages
exceeded the state’s police powers,70 noting, “A desirable end cannot be promoted by
prohibited means.”71
The Court indicated the law did not promote education, but rather arbitrarily and
unreasonably interfered with “the natural duty of the parent to give his children education
suitable to their station in life.”72 The Court chastened the legislature for attempting to
materially interfere with the power of parents to control the education of their children.73 This
decision affirmed the U.S. Constitution’s protection of parental educational choices for their
children.74 The Court also recognized the parental right to delegate their authority to a
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teacher was protected within the liberty interest set forth in the Fourteenth Amendment. The
United States Supreme Court found the Nebraska statute violated the U.S. Constitution and
reversed the judgment of the lower courts. 75
Pierce v. Society of the Sisters76

In 1922, during the same time period as Meyer, the voters of another western state,
Oregon, passed a referendum amending the state’s Compulsory Education Act.77 The
Compulsory Education Act, prior to the amendment, had required all children between eight
and sixteen years of age to attend public school. There were five exceptions incorporated into
the original Act, including one for children attending private school.78 The amendment
eliminated this private school exception. According to the amended statute, parents failing to
comply could be jailed for up to thirty days and fined up to $100.79 Both private nonsectarian
and religious schools objected to this statutory change. Two private schools, a Catholic
parochial school and a military academy, challenged the law. The Society of Sisters of the
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Holy Names of Jesus and Mary80 and Hill Military Academy81 sued the Governor of the State
of Oregon, the State Attorney General, and the County District Attorney.82 In response to the
enactment of the amended Act, parents had withdrawn their children from both schools for
fear of prosecution. Due to declining enrollment, the statute was creating irreparable injury to
the private educational institutions and their property values. The private schools won their
case before the Oregon District Court, which granted an injunction barring enforcement of the
Act.83 The defendants appealed their case directly to the United States Supreme Court.84
The United States Supreme Court heard the case in March 1925.85 The state’s lawyers
argued the state had an overriding interest in overseeing and controlling providers of
education to the children of Oregon. As to the minors, the state put forth its position as
parens patriae86 in support of its claim to unlimited authority over them.87 The state argued
the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment did not restrict the State’s power to enact laws
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that ensure the health and welfare of the people and, furthermore, did not apply to
corporations, but rather only to individuals.88 The State contended the two private schools fell
under the definition of a corporation. The private schools and parents pointed out they were
not contesting the right of the State to monitor the parental duty to insure children received an
education.89 Rather they were challenging the State’s authority to deny private schools as a
parental option for meeting this duty.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice McReynolds observed, “The child is not the
mere creature of the state.”90 Therefore, the State could not force students to attend a public
school.91 The Court further reasoned, “Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, we think it
entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.”92 The Court
unanimously upheld the lower court’s decision enjoining enforcement of the amended Act.93
“While recognizing that states have a valid interest in overseeing the functioning of schools,
the Court held the State did not have authority to usurp the role of parents as the primary
educator of children under a system of government that protects individual liberty.”94 The
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Court observed that by not providing the option for families to choose private education, the
law violated parental due process rights.95 Furthermore, the Court found the injunction sought
by the private schools was not against the exercise of a “proper power,” but rather against
unreasonable interference of the State with the schools and their patrons. “The Court’s
holding in Pierce stands as a charter of the rights of parents to direct the religious upbringing
of their children.”96 Pierce underscored the constant tension existing between the state’s
interest and the parent’s interest in children’s education.
In addition to the two aforementioned seminal Supreme Court decisions, ten additional
judicial opinions, including important Illinois decisions relevant to this study were issued
during the Scientific Sorting Machine era. A description of the relevant factors of each case
follows.
People v. Levisen97

Prior to this 1950 Illinois Supreme Court decision, parents were convicted of violating
Illinois’ Compulsory Attendance Law. 98 As previously described, this law required that
children between the ages of seven and sixteen must attend a public school in the district. The
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parents, college-educated Seventh Day Adventists, wanted their child to be educated at home
based on their religious beliefs. The parents believed the competitive environment of public
school would create a “pugnacious character” in their child, that faith in the Bible could not
be taught in the public schools, and that a mother is the best teacher and nature the best
lesson. 99

Prior to a judicial finding that the parents were violating the Compulsory

Attendance Law, the parents stipulated that their child had not attended either a public or a
private school, instead advising the court the mother had been teaching the child appropriate
grade-level material for five hours per day.100 The parents appealed their conviction to the
Illinois Supreme Court, claiming the evidence provided to the lower courts was insufficient
and failed to prove a violation of Illinois’ compulsory attendance law. Additionally the
parents argued the compulsory attendance statute was unconstitutional.101 Citing Meyer, the
parents argued the statute’s construction complemented the natural obligation of parents to
educate their children and to retain their right of control over them. 102 Justice Crampton
delivered the opinion of the court, reversing the conviction for violating the Illinois
Compulsory Attendance Law 103 : “It is the province of the court to determine what the
legislature meant by the term ‘private school’. Indeed, the question whether the child attends
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such a school within the meaning of the statute is the very issue in the case.” 104 The court
observed the statute was created for parents who neglected their obligation to educate, not to
punish those providing their children a quality education at home. 105 Although the parents
argued the Illinois compulsory attendance statute was unconstitutional, it was unnecessary for
the court to consider this claim due to the court’s decision to reverse the lower court’s
judgment.106 Justice Simpson dissented, asserting the majority’s findings could be used by
parents as a license to keep children at home rather than sending them to school.107
Morton v. Board of Education108

In 1964, parents filed a complaint to restrain the Chicago Board of Education from
maintaining a dual enrollment program, whereby high school students could simultaneously
attend two schools on a part-time basis, one public and the other private.109 Students enrolled
in the program took courses at both Kennedy High School and St. Paul High School.110 This
experimental dual enrollment plan was an attempt to improve the education of students
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enrolled in the Chicago Public Schools.111 The premise of the complaint was the program
allowed the parents of participating students to violate the Illinois Compulsory Attendance
Law.112 Additionally, the parents claimed the program itself violated the First Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution because of the resulting establishment and maintenance of religion.113
The trial court ruled the dual enrollment plan did not violate the statutory provisions and
dismissed the complaint. The decision was appealed.
The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, finding the program did
not violate the compulsory attendance law.114 Students were enrolled part time in a public
school and part time in a private school. Thus the court concluded students were receiving a
full-time, complete educational experience. The court observed the purpose of the
compulsory attendance law was for all children to be educated.115 The court also ruled the
program did not violate either the Illinois or United States Constitutions because the voluntary
program applied to all non-public schools and not to any religious groups.116
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Wisconsin v. Yoder117
On May 15, 1972, the United States Supreme Court decided Wisconsin v. Yoder. 118
The seminal Yoder decision, coupled with Meyer and Pierce, established the basis for judicial
responses to subsequent legal challenges to compulsory attendance statutes. In order to
understand this decision, it is crucial to first explore the history of the case. According to
Robert Rhodes, a contributing writer with the Mennonite Weekly Review, “it all began in
1968, when three Amish men--quiet farmers who lived near New Glarus, Wisconsin--were
arrested and convicted for refusing to send their children to a public high school, as required
by compulsory education laws.”119 Jonas Yoder and Wallace Miller were members of the Old
Order Amish and Adin Yutzy was a member of the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church.
All three parents refused to send their 14- and 15-year-old children to public school after they
completed the eighth grade based upon their belief such attendance was contrary to the Amish
religion and way of life.120 “The New Glarus Amish were reluctant to provide their children
with extensive formal schooling. Amish parents generally understood their children would
benefit from some instruction in subjects such as arithmetic and reading. The Amish
acknowledged the acquisition of basic skills in these areas would prove useful as the children
assumed greater responsibilities on farms and in their church communities. Schooling much
117
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beyond the elementary level was a grave threat to the Amish faith.”121 The trial court found
although the Wisconsin compulsory school attendance law did interfere with the parents’
ability to act in accordance with their religious beliefs, the law was a reasonable and
constitutional exercise of government power.122 Their conviction resulted in a $5 fine for
each parent.123 The case, however, was far from over.
The Wisconsin Circuit Court affirmed the convictions.124 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court, however, reversed the convictions based upon a conclusion the State had failed to
show cause to override the Amish families’ rights to freely exercise their religion.125 On
petition of the State of Wisconsin, the United States Supreme Court granted the writ of
certiorari126 to review the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision that the “State’s compulsory
school attendance laws were invalid under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment.”127
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Before the U.S. Supreme Court the Amish parents argued the compulsory attendance
law violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.128 As previously noted,
high school attendance conflicted with the Amish religion and way of life. The Amish
believed being compelled to send their children to high school could lead to “the censure of
the church community and also endanger their own salvation and that of their children.”129
Salvation in the Amish religion required “life in a church separate from the world and worldly
influences” that alienate man from God.130 It is important to note the State stipulated to the
fact that the Amish families’ religious beliefs were sincere. The Amish further argued high
school attendance would lead to great psychological harm to Amish children; exposure to
values, beliefs, and teachings contrary to Amish society; and destruction of the Old Order
Amish church community.131 The Amish viewed elementary education as permissible
because they “agree that their children must have basic skills in the three R’s in order to read
the Bible, to be good farmers and citizens, and to be able to deal with non-Amish people when
necessary in the course of daily affairs.” 132 Accordingly Amish parents trained their children
from early childhood through young adulthood on the skills necessary to be farmers, parents,
etc. This special vocational training better prepared them for Amish life than a formal high
school education.
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Echoing the beliefs previously espoused by Thomas Jefferson, the State argued
compulsory education was necessary to prepare self-reliant, self-sufficient citizens to
participate in the political system and preserve freedom.133 The State sought to protect the
Amish children from the ignorance that could result from their failure to participate in high
school.134 In support of its argument, the State pointed out Amish children who left their
church, would be ill-equipped to make their way in the world without the one or two
additional years of education Wisconsin required.135 Finally, the State, citing Prince v.
Massachusetts, argued a decision exempting Amish children from high school failed to
recognize the rights of the children to secondary education and “failed to give due regard to
the power of the State as parens patriae136 to extend the benefit of secondary education to
children regardless of the wishes of the parents.”137
The United States Supreme Court, relying “heavily on Meyer and Pierce, the seminal
substantive due process cases,” affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.138
By a six to one margin the High Court ruled Wisconsin’s compulsory education law violated
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the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.139 Justice Burger wrote the majority opinion
joined by Justices Blackman, Brennan, Stewart, White, and Marshall. Justices Powell and
Rehnquist did not take part. Justice Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion.140
In order to evaluate the Amish families’ claims, the Supreme Court needed to
determine whether “the Amish religious faith and their mode of life are, as they claim,
inseparable and interdependent.”141 Attorney Don Showalter, a constitutional law expert,
submitted a friend-of-the-court brief on behalf of the Mennonite Central Committee. In this
brief, Attorney Showalter outlined the Amish history and attempted to show “the uniqueness
of their entire way of life, and how this was inseparable from their approach to religion.”142
The Court explained, “to have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be
rooted in religious belief.”143 The Supreme Court found the traditional way of life of the
Amish was one of “deep religious conviction.”144 Therefore, the Court ruled the Amish way
of life was inextricably intertwined with their religious beliefs. While the Court accepted the
two primary propositions the State offered in support of compulsory education, namely
creating citizens to participate in the political system and preparing self-supportive people, the
evidence suggested “one or two years of formal high school for Amish children in place of
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their long-established program of informal vocational education would do little to serve those
interests.”145 With respect to the State’s argument about children who leave the Amish
religion being ill-equipped, the Supreme Court described the argument as highly speculative.
In summary, “the unchallenged testimony of acknowledged experts in education and religious
history, almost 300 years of consistent practice, and strong evidence of a sustained faith
pervading and regulating respondent’s entire mode of life support the claim that enforcement
of the State’s requirement of compulsory formal education after the eighth grade would
gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of respondent’s religious beliefs.”146 Lynn
Pasquerella observed, “The Court ruled the State failed to justify overriding the religious
rights of parents in this instance citing the self-sufficiency of the Amish community and the
absence of the Amish from dependency on welfare and embroilment with the criminal justice
system.”147 Chief Justice Burger stated, “This case involves the fundamental interest of
parents, as contrasted with that of the state, to guide the religious future and education of their
children. The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental
concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in
the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring tradition.”148
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Jeff Prather points out, “The court held that the parental liberty to direct the education of their
children as established in Meyer was fundamental.”149
Justice Douglas’ dissent argued a child who expressed a desire to attend a public high
school, in spite of parents’ wishes, should not be prevented from doing so.150 The majority
responded by pointing out the State never tried the case on that point.151 Justice Douglas
discussed the constitutionally protected interests of children as well as their rights to be
heard.152 In his dissent, Justice Douglas argued it was the future of the students, not the
parents, that was affected by the Court’s decision.153 The majority responded by reiterating
that it was the parents subjected to prosecution and the children were not part of the
litigation.154
Scoma v. Chicago Board of Education 155

In 1974, Julie and Richard Scoma, residing in Chicago, withdrew their children from
public school in order to provide home school instruction, which they believed should qualify
as a private school exemption under the definition provided in the Illinois Compulsory
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Attendance Act.156,157 The parents were contacted by a truant officer and informed the
children would be removed from the home by the state if they failed to return to school.158
The Scomas filed a five-count complaint with the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. Count 1 alleged the Illinois Compulsory
Attendance Act deprived them of their parental rights guaranteed by the First, Fourth, Fifth,
Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.159 Count II alleged the
Illinois Compulsory School Attendance Act160 deprived them of substantive due process and
equal protection of the laws, a violation of the Fourteenth amendment, and was vague in its
application.161 Count III claimed the statute was unconstitutional in that it used public schools
as the standard for acceptable private schools, thereby violating the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution.162 Count IV and Count V alleged the Chicago
Board of Education conspired to deny the Scomas their constitutional rights and failed to
prevent this violation from occurring. The Scomas requested a three-judge court163 to hear the
case, and also sought to have the Illinois Compulsory School Attendance Law declared
unconstitutional.
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In response, the Chicago Board of Education requested the court to dismiss the
Scoma’s complaint, deny their request for a three-judge court and injunctive relief.164 The
Chicago Board of Education based their motion to dismiss on their assertions that the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois lacked jurisdiction over the complaint
and the Scomas failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted.165 The motion to
dismiss based on the jurisdictional argument was denied, but the movement to dismiss based
on the Scomas’ failure to state a claim was affirmed. The Scomas failed to prove irreparable
injury, a requirement for injunctive relief. “Such injury is generally measured by the ‘chilling
effect’ suffered by a plaintiff…but plaintiffs certainly were not chilled to the degree that they
became frozen into inaction.”166 In Count I, the parents asserted fundamental constitutional
rights, namely the right to educate their children as they saw fit without government
intrusion.167 The court found the state acted reasonably in enforcing the Compulsory
Attendance Act and the parents’ perceived right to educate their children as they saw fit was
not constitutionally protected.168 Citing Levisen, the court reminded the parents a private
school could include home instruction provided instruction was commensurate with public
school standards.169

The court, contrasting the arguments asserted in Yoder and Pierce with

those set forth by the Scomas, observed the parents’ decision to home school their children
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was not based on any religious belief, but rather on personal choice, not within the bounds of
constitutional protection. As to Count II, claiming the deprivation of equal protection of the
laws and right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, the court found the state
system was related to legitimate state purposes. Citing Pierce, the court reiterated the State’s
authority to regulate schools, their teachers, and students.170 As set forth in Levisen, the
burden to prove that home instruction qualifies as “private school” under the statute rests
solely with the parents.171 Again citing Levisen, the court also dismissed the Scomas
arguments relative to the unconstitutional vagueness of the term “public schools.” In light of
the Scoma’s failure to raise a substantial constitutional question, their motion for a threejudge court was denied.172 Based on the Scoma’s failure to state a claim, the court granted the
Board of Education’s motion to dismiss the Scoma’s complaint.173
Concerned Citizens for Neighborhood Schools, Inc. v. Board of Education 174

In this 1974 case, Concerned Citizens for Neighborhood Schools, Inc., a corporate
organization, filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment finding the Tennessee
compulsory attendance law unconstitutional under both the Tennessee and U.S. Constitutions
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and filed a motion for injunction of enforcement of the compulsory attendance law.175 The
complaint asserted the primary purpose of the Tennessee compulsory attendance laws was not
educational but rather to desegregate the schools.176

Concerned Citizens claimed such a

purpose violated the parents’ and students’ rights “to due process, equal protection of the law,
freedom of assembly, and privacy.”177 Three threshold issues were considered by the court:
the jurisdiction of the court, the corporations standing to maintain the lawsuit, and the
question related to convening a three-judge court.178 The court, citing Pierce and Yoder,
denied the desegregation claim and pointed out compulsory attendance laws predated the era
of school desegregation: “The long and wide spread experience under compulsory attendance
laws and their infrequent constitutional challenge renders them more a measure of the
commitment of the Nation to education than a measure of constitutional limitations in this
sector of the law.”179 The court determined Concerned Citizens had only an academic
interest in the issue of compulsory school attendance because the corporation was not a
parent, taxpayer, student, school or school personnel.180 Therefore, the corporation had no
standing to maintain the lawsuit.181 The corporation filed a motion asking that it be allowed
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to amend the original submission to include individual complainants.182 While the motion
had errors, the court did allow the amended petition if corrections were made.183 Ultimately,
the court, citing Yoder and Pierce, ruled the federal constitutional issue raised by the plaintiff
was both “insubstantial” and “essentially fictitious” because the complaint failed to put forth
evidence requiring court action.184 Therefore, a three-judge court was not required. The case
was dismissed.185
Sheehan v. Scott186

In 1973, William Sheehan missed fourteen days of school in two months and was
threatened with prosecution.187 William Sheehan, by his father, Henry Sheehan, filed an
action on behalf of himself and all children who were subject to the Illinois compulsory
school attendance statute.188 Specifically Mr. Sheehan sought an injunction against
enforcement of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act,189 which defined minors in need of supervision
as students who are habitually truant from school. The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois dismissed the complaint due to the failure to “present a
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substantial constitutional question.”190 The Sheehans appealed claiming the words
“habitually truant" were unconstitutionally vague.191 The Court disagreed, observing the
judicial definition of “habitual” meant “constant, customary, accustomed, usual, common,
ordinary or done so often and repeatedly as to for a habit.”192 The court ruled the parent’s
arguments lacked substance and failed to set forth a justiciable constitutional question.193 The
court highlighted the fact the student was not expressing anything of a protected nature
through his absenteeism.194 The student, citing Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder, argued the State’s
right to compel school attendance was sharply limited.195 The court held the principles
presented in the aforementioned cases were not alleged in this case. The court highlighted the
findings in all three of the aforementioned cases supported the right of the State to make
reasonable regulations for schools and to compel school attendance generally. 196 The
Sheehans argued they were unaware of what needed to be done to comply with the law. The
court stated, “The simple answer is to comply with the law which requires compulsory
attendance at school by going to school.”197 The dismissal of the case was affirmed.198
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Chicago Board of Education v. Kouba199

In 1974, Karen Kouba was a minor student found guilty in the Circuit Court of Cook
County of habitual truancy and subsequently committed to the Northeastern Illinois
Residential School.200,201 According to the petition filed with the Circuit Court of Cook
County by the truancy officer, Karen Kouba had been habitually truant from Holden
Elementary School for 63.5 days.202 In an effort to improve Karen’s attendance, the truancy
officer had conducted nine home visits, meeting with the mother each time.203 Karen filed a
motion to delay her commitment and appealed the decision, asserting the Board of Education
failed to prove her truant behavior beyond a reasonable doubt.204 In her appeal, Karen
dropped her challenge to the constitutionality of the compulsory attendance statute, asking the
court to focus only on whether or not sufficient evidence of habitual truancy existed. 205 The
court reversed the district court’s disposition ruling based upon a determination the Board of
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Education failed to prove the student’s truancy beyond a reasonable doubt.206 Although
Karen had missed 63.5 days of school over two academic years, the Board of Education only
provided evidence of nine home visit days when truancy could be established.207 No attempt
was made by the Board of Education to establish the remaining 54.5 days of truancy in
court.208 The court concluded, “The evidence in the record does not support the finding of
habitual truancy beyond a reasonable doubt because it does not support beyond a reasonable
doubt the ‘habitual’ element of the finding.”209 As a result the Appellate Court of Illinois,
First District, Second Division, reversed the circuit court’s decision.210
Chicago Board of Education v. Terrile 211

On April 23, 1974, a habitual truant petition for Bonnie Jean Terrile was filed in the
Circuit Court of Cook County, Juvenile Division.212 The truant officer for the Chicago Board
of Education filed the petition based on Bonnie Jean Terrile’s repeated absences from Graham
School.213 Terrile claimed the 100 days (stipulated later to be 126 days) of absences were due
to medical illness and motioned the court for an impartial medical examination by a court206
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appointed expert.214 In lieu of a court order for a medical examination, the judge requested
Terrile to provide the court with the medical report from her attending physician, Dr.
Knapp.215 Terrile was unable to secure such a statement from Dr. Knapp. In fact, during the
course of the trial, testimony was given by a school official that Dr. Knapp had told the
official there was no medical reason why Terrile should not be attending school.216 Terrile
was found guilty of habitual truancy in Cook County, Illinois, and was subsequently
transferred to the Chicago Parental School for Truant Youth.217
Terrile appealed this decision to the Appellate Court of Illinois, raising four issues for
the appellate court’s review: whether she was denied due process of law when she was
transferred without considering whether or not the correctional school was the least restrictive
environment for her to be educated; whether she was deprived equal protection of the law due
to her prosecution under a different statutory scheme based on her residential address;
whether the terms “habitual truant” and “a fit person to be committed,” which appear in the
Illinois compulsory attendance statute, are unconstitutionally vague; and whether evidence,
beyond a reasonable doubt, was presented to the lower court.218 Citing Levisen, the court
reiterated the purpose of the compulsory attendance law was to ensure all children received a
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minimal education.219 This education must occur in the least restrictive environment.220 The
court observed, based on Levisen, the State’s only interest was to achieve that purpose. The
court stated, “Punishment is clearly not a legitimate interest.”221 The court found the student
had been denied due process of law based on the lack of evidence the Chicago Parental
School commitment was the least restrictive alternative.222 The Board of Education had failed
to identify alternatives to commitment available to educate the minor. The minor had
significant medical and psychological problems, yet school officials failed to make any
referrals for medical or psychological examination.223 The court outlined the restrictive
atmosphere of the correctional school, which limits the personal liberties and freedoms of the
committed truant. 224 The Board of Education failed to prove that less restrictive alternatives
could not meet Terrile’s needs and that the Chicago Parental School could meet the needs of
the habitually truant minor.225 The court reversed the lower court’s conviction.226
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Hanson v. Cushman 227

In 1979, Lowell and Carol Hanson, the parents of four children, educated their
children at home with the help of another adult, Charlotte O’Brien, who lived in the Hanson’s
home. The children were enrolled in a home study program in Ann Arbor, Michigan.228
Carol Hanson contacted the State Board of Education and was repeatedly informed that a
certified teacher must provide the home instruction.229 The attendance officer came to the
home and gave the Hansons a letter threatening court action if the children did not return to
the public school.230 The school district’s assistant superintendent also went to the home and
informed the Hansons they could not enroll their children in a home study program without a
certified teacher.231 A Michigan State Police officer, who had been asked by school officials
to investigate the Hanson home, eventually filed a neglect petition in Montcalm County
Juvenile Court alleging Lowell and Carol Hanson failed to provide their children with an
appropriate education.232 As a result of the court proceedings, the Hansons agreed to hire a
certified teacher to come to their home pending the final outcome of the litigation.
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The Hansons filed an action against Michigan school and police officials seeking a
declaratory judgment that the Michigan compulsory attendance law233 was unconstitutional
and deprived them of the right to educate their children as they saw fit.234 The school and
police officials filed a motion seeking declaratory judgment and dismissal of the claim.235
The court considered the narrow issue of whether parents had the right to educate children in
the home without complying with the state “certified teacher” regulation.236 The parents
believed the United States Constitution protected their right to control the education of their
children. The court observed, “The case stands or falls on their argument that this claimed
right rises to the level of a ‘fundamental’ constitutional right.”237 The parents were not able to
identify a fundamental constitutional right for parents to educate their children in their home.
Rather, the parents cited Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder to support their claim. The court, citing
extended portions of the same U.S. Supreme Court cases, found the parental right to educate
their children at home without compliance with state law was a personal choice outside the
realm of constitutional protection.238 The court pointed out both Meyer and Pierce confirmed
the power of the State to compel attendance and regulate schools. The court further indicated
no religious belief similar to the parental belief present in Yoder existed in this case.239
233

Mich. Comp. Laws § 380.1561

234

Hanson, supra note 227, at 110.

235

Id.

236

Id. at 112.

237

Id.

238

Id. at 114.

239

Id.

48
Therefore, the Hansons’ choice to educate their children at home without a certified teacher
failed to fall within the bounds of a constitutionally protected right.240 The court found the
State acted reasonably in its enforcement of the compulsory attendance laws.241 The decision
declared the Michigan statutes constitutional.242 The court granted school officials’ motions
to dismiss.243
People v. Berger244

Delores and Lawrence Berger were charged with permitting their daughter to be truant
in violation of the Illinois compulsory attendance statute.245,246 Their daughter missed 339.5
days during the 1979 and 1980 school years.247 Mrs. Berger claimed her daughter was ill due
to allergies and she had seen 13 doctors within a two-year time period.248 The truant officer
advised the parents that once the parents provided the school medical certification of their
daughter’s medical condition, homebound tutoring would be provided. Documentation
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received from a family practitioner, Dr. Aven, indicated the minor could attend school.249
The mother and father were convicted and sentenced to one year of probation.250
The parents appealed the conviction arguing they were not proved guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.251 The parents argued mere absences did not constitute truancy, citing the
statutory terms “without valid cause” as support for their claim.252 The parents argued illness
was a valid cause that was not statutorily required to be supported by a doctor’s
certification.253 The court concluded the school’s requirement for a doctor’s excuse after five
consecutive days of absences was reasonable. 254 Despite the parents’ claims that their
daughter suffered from various medical conditions necessitating her to be under a doctor’s
care and unable to attend school, they failed to provide the school with a physician’s
certification of their daughter’s medical condition. In fact, the evidence indicated none of the
thirteen doctors who had seen Christine stated she was unable to attend school.255 Citing
Morton, the court emphasized the objective of compulsory attendance was that all children be
educated.256 The minor’s habitual truancy was proved beyond a reasonable doubt.257 The
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court found the Berger parents knew about and supported Christine’s truancy. The court
affirmed the lower court’s decision.258

New Paradigm (1983-Present)
While the aforementioned legal decisions were formulated during Fowler’s Scientific
Sorting Machine period, the remaining cases were decided during the “New Paradigm”
education policy years (1983-present).259 As Fowler explains, these years are characterized
by a general dissatisfaction with education, rigorous education reform, increased inflation,
and increased unemployment.260 A 1983 federal commission report, A Nation at Risk,
highlighted the public education system’s failure to prepare its students for competition in the
world economy.261 This report, coupled with pervasive dissatisfaction with the education
system, prompted a “vigorous education reform movement (or, rather, several overlapping
and contradictory reform movements) that flourish to this day.”262 School reform was
identified as the solution to a shrinking world, characterized by stiff competition for global
markets and economic uncertainty, following the end of the post-World War II economic
boom. Three main proposals for school reform were introduced during this era: a return to
the Common School model, restructuring based on greater professionalization, and
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redesigning education to include market elements.263 The education reform movement’s core
values during the New Paradigm have been “freedom of choice” and “excellence.”264 Policy
type and institutional choice preferences differ between the three education reform proposals.
Despite their differences, however, there exists greater uniformity with international norms in
all three proposals.265 Several compulsory school attendance challenges and legal decisions
relevant to this study have occurred during the New Paradigm era.
Duro v. District Attorney, Second Judicial District of North Carolina266

In 1981, Peter Duro, a Pentecostal father of six children, refused to enroll his children
in public or private school because he did not want his children to be corrupted by people who
failed to share his Pentecostal religious beliefs.267 However, the Pentecostal religion did not
require home instruction, as evidenced by the fact a majority of children from the Pentecostal
Church attended public school.268 Furthermore, Mr. Duro acknowledged when his children
reached the age of eighteen, they were expected to secure employment in the world.269 In
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1981, Peter Duro was charged with violating the North Carolina Compulsory Attendance
Law.270 Due to technical difficulties, the warrants were quashed.
Peter Duro filed action, alleging North Carolina’s compulsory attendance law violated
his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights because his religious beliefs barred him from
enrolling his children in public school.271 The federal district court, relying heavily on Yoder,
ruled in favor of Mr. Duro.272 The court found Peter Duro expressed a sincere religious belief,
akin to the beliefs held by the Amish in Yoder.273
The attorney general appealed the court’s decision. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed and ruled the State’s interest related to school
attendance outweighed the father’s religious interest.274 The appellate court found the district
court had incorrectly interpreted and applied the Yoder decision:275 “The Duros, unlike their
Amish counterparts, were not members of a community that had existed for three centuries
and had a long history of being a successful, self-sufficient, segment of American society.”276
The Yoder court had observed Amish children’s exposure to outside influence would pose a
threat to the entire Amish community and the State’s educational interest failed to outweigh
the Amish religious beliefs. Additional distinguishing factual differences between Yoder and
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Duro were also highlighted in the appellate court’s decision.277 The Pentecostal religion did
not espouse the same unique nature as the Amish community and failed to have the longevity
evident in their Amish counterparts. In addition, Peter Duro refused to send his children to
any school, whereas Amish children were educated in public schools through the eighth
grade.278 Finally, Peter Duro was unable to prove home instruction would prepare his children
to be self-sufficient, contributing members in the American political system, a compelling
interest of the State.279 The court concluded, “North Carolina has demonstrated an interest in
compulsory education which is of sufficient magnitude to override Duro’s religious
interest.”280 The district court decision was reversed.281
Mazanec v. North Judson-San Pierre School Corp.282
Richard and Barbara Mazanec, Jehovah’s Witnesses, founded the Greenhouse
Academy, a not-for-profit home school in Indiana.283 The academy, founded because of the
parents’ sincere religious beliefs, utilized the state-mandated curriculum, coupled with
religious and moral teachings. In August 1980, the Mazanecs received a letter from the North
Judson-San Pierre public school officials advising them classes had begun and their children
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were not enrolled. The Mazanecs informed local school district authorities their children
were going to be enrolled in the Greenhouse Academy, a school that complied with the
Indiana school attendance statute but adhered to an alternative school year calendar with a
later start date.284 Nevertheless, in September 1980, the Mazanecs were charged with
violating the state’s compulsory attendance laws because their children were unlawfully
absent from the Indiana public schools.285 In March 1980, the Mazanecs received a letter
from the State Attendance Officer notifying them they were, in fact, in compliance with the
law.286 It was not until September 1981, however, that the criminal action pending against the
Mazanecs was dismissed.
Despite the criminal proceedings being dismissed, the parents alleged the State’s
prosecuting attorney threatened them with future prosecution.287 The Mazanecs brought
action to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend
Division, based on the following allegations: they were denied due process of law in that
their First Amendment rights to religious freedom were violated; they were subjected to
selective prosecution denying them due process and equal protection of the law; and the
actions of the school officials had caused them emotional and physical distress.288
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found the Indiana compulsory attendance statute289 required children must be in attendance at
school for the “full term,” specifying no particular dates.290 Additionally, the court
determined that based on the attendance officer allowing the criminal prosecution to continue
for 11 months, a genuine issue of good faith existed.291 The court denied the school district’s
motion for summary judgment.292 “Because a genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether or not the parents were threatened with future prosecution, the court retained
jurisdiction over the claims seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.”293
In 1985, following two published appellate opinions,294 the court entertained a
supplemental briefing mandated by the appellate court.295 The court denied the parental
request for injunctive relief because all criminal charges brought against Barbara Mazanec
had been either dismissed or resolved.296 In addition, the court, citing Pierce, held there was a
constitutional right to educate children in a home environment, with the understanding that
the State has a legitimate interest in ensuring minimal educational requirements are met.297 It
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was determined, based on the record of evidence, that instruction provided by the parents in
their home school was equivalent to the instruction in the public schools.298
Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton299

In 1986, two fundamentalist Baptist church schools, along with their pastors,
principals, parents, teachers and students, challenged specific requirements of the Iowa
compulsory attendance laws.300 ,301 In particular, they objected to the requirements that
private school principals file annual reports with the local school districts and that parents had
to enroll children in a public school, or a school offering equivalent instruction by a certified
teacher, until completion of the eighth grade.302 The federal district court found Iowa’s
compulsory attendance law was constitutional but acknowledged the term “equivalent
instruction” was unconstitutionally vague.303 The church and its members further argued they
were entitled to the “Amish exemption.”304 Both the district court and Iowa Supreme Court
disagreed and denied the application of the “Amish exemption.”305 Both courts found the
only commonality between the Amish and the fundamentalist Baptist church group was the
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sincerity of beliefs.306 The court held, in contrast to the Amish, the beliefs described by the
church group were "greatly less interwoven with their daily mode of life.”307 Ultimately, the
members of the fundamentalist Baptist church groups would be engaged members of society,
unlike the Amish. The churches appealed the district court’s findings. They argued the
reporting requirement violated the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause and freedom of
association rights.308 Citing Pierce, Brown, and Yoder, the appellate court reiterated the most
important function of state and local governments is the education of its citizenry.309 With
respect to the balancing process, the State’s interest with respect to receiving reliable
information about children’s education outweighed the principals’ religious beliefs.310 The
court agreed with the district court that the reporting requirements did not infringe upon free
exercise of religion.311 In light of the fact the churches proposed that parents report the
required information to the district, rather than the principals, the court found parents were not
concerned with maintaining privacy; therefore, the reporting requirement produced no burden
on the their freedom of association.312 The churches further argued the teacher certification
requirement violated the Free Exercise Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Establishment
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Clause and the teachers’ freedom of expression.313 The appellate court agreed with the
district court and found nothing in the certification requirement violated the parents’ rights.314
The court agreed with the Iowa Supreme Court in its findings that the position put forth by the
parents was “not altogether consistent.”315 The group’s objections to state licensure
requirements were not consistently applied by the group to all occupations within and outside
of the church. The court observed, for example, that the group did not object to the driver’s
license requirement for the church’s bus drivers or licensing requirements for physicians and
other occupations of its members.316 Finally, with respect to the “Amish exemption”
challenge, the appellate court stressed its belief that the U.S. Supreme Court intended this
exemption to be extremely narrow and ruled denial of the exemption to the Baptist Church did
not violate their right to equal protection of the law.317
The historical examination of judicial decisions that have affected compulsory
attendance and compulsory education laws during distinct eras described by Frances Fowler
provides insight into trends and future policy considerations. The social and policy
environments of compulsory attendance legal challenges and decisions are made clear when
viewed through the lens of Frances Fowler’s four theoretical perspectives. Set in motion
during the 17th century, compulsory attendance laws continue to impact current legislative and
judicial opinions.
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CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

This study utilized both standard legal research methodology and historical research to
provide educational leaders with information and insight to legal rulings and education policy
implications related to compulsory school attendance. Research Questions 1, 2, 3, and 4
below provided the framework for this study:
1. What is the relevant legal history of compulsory school attendance in the United
States?
2. What is the status of current compulsory school attendance laws?
3. How can a historical review of laws, interventions, and effectiveness inform future
compulsory school attendance legislation?
4. Can an examination of compulsory school attendance judicial decisions in their
historical context and through the lens of the four theoretical perspectives (competing
values perspective, Lowi’s policy types perspective, institutional choice perspective
and international convergence perspective) presented by Frances Fowler glean
beneficial insight into trends and future policy recommendations?
Standard legal research methodology was utilized for this study including the following:

60


An examination of the language employed by the courts in relevant federal and state
court rulings, primarily focusing on state appellate case law. These legal sources were
analyzed and historically compared in terms of compulsory school attendance
language patterns, definitions and interpretations of terminology used by the courts
and the application of terms and concepts (like “Amish exemption”) utilized by
courts. Changes in applied definitions and interpretations are highlighted throughout
the study.



The historical background for compulsory school attendance case law and statutes as
addressed in law reviews and other scholarly publications were examined for legal and
education policy trends and interpretations. Specifically, compulsory attendance was
examined through the lens of the four theoretical frameworks set forth by Frances C.
Fowler.1 These documents were analyzed and synthesized to develop a historical
perspective of the evolution of compulsory school attendance laws, delineate the
current legal status, and hypothesize likely future directions of the law.



The strength, consistency and range of cited historical compulsory school attendance
judicial and scholarly interpretations of case law and law reviews were analyzed.



The major compulsory school attendance cases, including interpretations applied and
not applied by the courts in making their decisions, were examined. For example,
interpretations of the Amish exemption as set forth in Wisconsin v. Yoder and the
definition of private school set forth in Pierce are woven throughout compulsory
school attendance case law.
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Qualitative and Legal Scholarship

Similarities exist between legal research and qualitative research. The qualitative
researcher relies on the interpretation of phenomena, most typically occurring within the
natural settings; keen observation skills; analysis; and corroboration from multiple evidentiary
sources.2 The legal scholar relies on “meanings formulated not by the researcher, but by the
courts and various law making bodies on specific legal issues.”3
Law students conducting legal research identify issues, examine authoritative sources
for relevant rules, analyze connections between these rules and the facts being examined, and
draw conclusions based on the synthesis of the aforementioned process.4 In this study, legal
scholarship expands legal research to include broader inquiries into patterns, problems,
contexts, effects, and outcomes related to the compulsory school and attendance laws and the
field of education.5 Simultaneously, this study takes the form of historical inquiry, a tradition
in qualitative educational research.6
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Thurgood Marshall Law Library Guide to Legal Research (2014) available at
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Qualitative and Legal Saturation

Data saturation is required for both qualitative research and legal scholarship.
Qualitative researchers collect data until no new information that will address the research
question is found.7 A similar principle guides the data gathering process in legal research;
however, new insights are always possible in legal examination, given the constantly
changing nature of law.8 Data saturation can be claimed when new data does not add
distinctive information relevant to the research.9 During this study, data saturation was
obtained when only cases still in the process of litigation could offer any new insight to the
topic of compulsory school attendance.

Shepardizing

The legal researcher, pursuing data saturation, utilizes the Shepards Citation system.
While case law and law review footnotes provide historical information contributing to the
case, “Shepardizing” the case assists the researcher in following the path of the case’s past
history and future impact on case law and law reviews.10 Online Shepardizing includes full
case titles and links to related cases. Information on whether legal decisions have been
reaffirmed, overturned, questioned or cited by later cases is essential to legal examination
7
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saturation. The purpose of Shepardizing is to inform the researcher if the authorities of
preceding cases are still good, having not been overturned, or whether future cases impacted
the established legal principles.11 Shepardizing allows the researcher to identify additional
relevant references. Statutes, constitutions, law reviews, and ordinances can be Shepardized.
For example, in researching compulsory school attendance, the seminal Yoder case led
directly to the earlier cases discussed in Chapter Two. A legal trajectory from Yoder to Pierce
could be followed. Despite Pierce being over eighty years old, the case continues to be cited
in contemporary compulsory school attendance cases as “good law.”
Even with the availability of the Shepardizing tool, searches for relevant legal case
law may still be limited. The lack of published court materials, coupled with the wait time
associated with the appellate process, are examples of limitations. For example, when a court
rules in a case, the official copy of the decision may not be available for several months.
While an interim, slip opinion is likely available, officially paginated decisions can be
reviewed only when the case is published in official court reporters. Decisions include
majority opinions, concurring opinions, and dissenting opinions.

Majority written legal

opinions explain the position of all the judges agreeing with the decision, while the dissenting
opinion explains the position of the judges disagreeing with the decision. Typically, judges
will dissent when they believe that other judges incorrectly interpreted legal precedents.
Concurring opinions explain the position of judges who agree with the majority decision, but
for a reason different than the one set forth by the majority. Dissenting or concurring

11

How to Shephardize: Updating Legal Research Using the Shephard’s Citations Service on LexisNexis (2004),
available at https://law.wustl.edu/Courses/Kloempken/PDFs/HowtoShepardize.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2015).
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opinions can prove to be extremely important in setting the stage for future legal challenges.
A legal researcher must consider relevant case law, understanding that future review of these
decisions may be possible. Thus, the fluidity of case law creates a data saturation challenge.
Legal research relevant at the time of publication could potentially be deemed less relevant in
the future.
Shepardizing was used to review relevant legal cases and supporting literature until no
new information was found that could inform Research Questions 1, 2, 3, and 4. Data was
collected through historical and contemporary reviews of case law relevant to compulsory
school attendance. Compulsory school attendance and compulsory education were search
terms utilized most often to yield new information. This study examines judicial decisions
since the 1600’s which have affected compulsory school attendance and compulsory
education laws.

This researcher then examined law reviews available through legal

databases such as LexisNexis and Westlaw; constitutional law casebooks; final judicial
decisions; congressional records; federal regulations; legal codes; amicus briefs, court records
such as depositions and testimony, transcripts, complaints, and other communications from
those associated with the case; and websites devoted to the trajectory of compulsory school
attendance cases. The majority of cases presented are from the United States Supreme Court,
United States Appellate Courts, United States District Courts, Illinois Supreme Court, and
Illinois State Courts. Cases from other states are included only when necessary.
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Qualitative and Legal Triangulation
In qualitative research, the process of triangulation is utilized to strengthen validity. 12
Primary data is measured against other credible data sources. Triangulation may entail data
gathering through multiple sampling strategies (data triangulation), multiple researchers
gathering data (investigator triangulation), the use of more than one theoretical position for
data interpretation (theoretical triangulation), and/or the use of multiple data gathering
methods (methodological triangulation).

13

In legal research, similar triangulation is

accomplished through gathering data from a variety of sources such as law reviews, case law,
and statutory materials. The variety of perspectives achieved through qualitative triangulation
must be discovered within the body of law and related law reviews. This researcher reviewed
law reviews, case law, statutes, and fact patterns related to compulsory attendance
requirements. Legal precedents were

analyzed for consistency of rationale, consistency or

legal tests, and consistency of outcomes. Historical time frames and compulsory school
attendance trends were delineated.

Theoretical Frameworks and Legal Scholarship

Legal scholarship can be enriched through the lens of theoretical frameworks. This
researcher analyzed compulsory attendance in their historical context utilizing the four
theoretical frameworks (competing values perspective, Lowi’s policy types perspective,
12

Alan Bryman, Triangulation, Encyclopedia of Social Science Research Methods (2003) SAGE Publications. 8
Nov. 2011 available at http://www.sagepub.com/chambliss4e/study/chapter/encyc_pdfs/4.2_Triangulation.pdf
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institutional choice perspective, and international convergence perspective) presented by
Frances C. Fowler. 14 Patterns related to policy development and the values highlighted in
each of the four perspectives were used to historically analyze compulsory school attendance.
Three interpretative frameworks (textualist, archaeological, and future) were used to identify
consistencies and trends between courts. The textualist framework assists researchers’
examination of terminology used in legal proceedings. For example, a legal definition of
“education” has been crafted by the courts through its reliance on accepted definitions, rules
of grammar, statute structure, related statutory provisions, and canons.15 Legal researchers
can utilize an archaeological framework to provide the historical context of public opinion
related to a legal issue at the given time. The use of historical legislative reconstruction as
context for legal interpretation can offer some evidence of legislative intent.16 For example,
in this study, the definition of “school attendance” set forth in Pierce could have varied if the
time period of the case had been different, potentially affecting the case outcome. Finally,
judges and legal researchers, by utilizing the interpretive framework, may suggest the
meaning of a legal precedent by considering the current circumstances, social norms, medical
or scientific discoveries, and alternative legal contexts. When judges apply precedents, they
frequently must choose the most valid interpretation applicable to the legal challenge before
them.

14

Fowler, supra note 1, at 301.

15

William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 609, 610 (1990).

16

Id.at 611.
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Canons are established when several cases share similar fact patterns and holdings by
the courts. Canons include common assumptions about how statutes are drafted, institutional
roles, and how the public participates in the process. While canons comprise general
theoretical frameworks used in legal research, courts may provide specific theoretical
frameworks for interpretation and decision making. For example, the court in Yoder set forth
the three-prong question to determine whether or not a violation of the Free Exercise Clause
existed. This test, coupled with the canons established through Meyer and Pierce, has been
used to answer compulsory school attendance challenges since 1972.

Claims and Themes in Qualitative and Legal Scholarship

One way to track findings and consider legal and/or policy patterns is to organize
information in a meaningful way. Qualitative researchers often use a coding system to
organize information, establish relationships, and divulge overarching organizing patterns.17
Similarly, legal researchers analyze their work within the broader context of legal theory,
trends, policy, and practice. Care must be given to following the legal trails relevant to the
study until its most recent end, thereby avoiding the mistake of relying on overturned rulings.
In this study, United States Supreme Court, lower federal appellate court, and Illinois state
decisions were reviewed and chronologically organized. Fact patterns and holdings of the
seminal cases of Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder were used to analyze compulsory school
attendance statutes and related challenges. Cases were then examined utilizing the values

17

J. Saldana, The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers (SAGE, 2009).
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presented by Fowler in the four theoretical frameworks. Patterns and trends are highlighted in
Chapter Four of this study.

Conclusion

The fluid, value-laden historical environment driving compulsory school attendance
case laws and their education policy implications suggests compulsory attendance issues
which plague school districts and educational leaders are likely to continue. The evidence
presented of historically ineffective policies and implementation strategies are at risk of being
repeated. Since it is not enough to simply document the legal trail supporting a particular
ruling, this study aimed to uncover the historical context of court rulings, changing
circumstances, and a description of how the changes influenced future legal outcomes and
policy development. The “idea of the law” and its application during critical historical
moments were traced back to the seventeenth century. The goal was to reveal distinct legal
patterns, learn from historical policy development and implementation issues, and help to
linform future legal and policy decisions. Themes and conclusions to be discussed in
Chapters Four and Five were developed in light of both original meaning and subsequent
changes.
In adopting standard legal methodology, this researcher examined the relationship
between compulsory school attendance court rulings and policy development. An
examination of compulsory school attendance judicial decisions in their historical context
through theoretical frameworks may glean beneficial insight into trends and future policy
recommendations.

CHAPTER FOUR

ANALYSIS

The study of key elements surrounding compulsory attendance legislation and judicial
decisions during the presented distinct eras provides useful information for both current
analysis and further study.

It is important to understand how today’s United States

compulsory school attendance policy environment, viewed through Fowler’s theoretical lens,
has been legislatively and judicially crafted since the 1600’s. This knowledge helps identify
important considerations for legislators and educational leaders.

Purpose of Education

Arguments related to the purpose of education have echoed in United States
courtrooms for centuries. The defined purpose of education changed with the dawn of each
new era. The relationship between compulsion to attend school and the purpose of education
within school has and continues to be inextricably intertwined. It is difficult to consider one
without referencing the other.

The judiciary has wrestled with this relationship when

addressing challenges to compulsory attendance statutes. As will be highlighted later, judges
have repeatedly been presented the unenviable task of trying to balance century-old purposes
with modern-day realities.
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When attendance at school was first compelled, education’s purpose appeared evident.
Children needed to adopt moral and religious principle, and then learn to read and write. “In a
community committed to doctrinal purity, compulsory education was as much a religious
discipline as it was a means of insuring literacy.”1 Prior to the Young Republic era, child
rearing was at the heart of compulsory attendance initiatives.2
With the dawn of the Young Republic era, citizens genuinely desired literacy skills.3
Parents wanted control over their children’s education and had choices available to them for
exercising this control.4 As the number of immigrants rose, however, the setting of this era
was characterized by disparity among classes and a cry for the establishment of common
schools for the benefit of the populace. As a result, a shift in purpose began.
With the dawn of the Rise of the Common Schools era, the purpose transitioned from
child rearing to populace unification and crisis management.5 Fear stemming from cultural
differences resulting from an influx of immigrants created a conflicted nation. Government
regulation increased in pursuit of stabilization. 6

During this era, compulsory school

attendance law “reflected subtle changes in attitude toward state authority.”7 Parents were
perceived as incapable of teaching American democratic values to their children. Hence, a
1

Samuel L.Blumenfeld, Is Public Education Necessary? 18 (2nd ed. 1985).

2

Wayne J. Urban & Jennings L. Wagoner Jr., American Education: A History 172 (3rd ed. 2004).

3

Francis C. Fowler, Policy Studies for Educational Leaders: An Introduction 303 (4th ed. 2013).

4

Id. at 304.

5

Id. at 307.

6

Id.
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David Tyack, Thomas James & Aaron Benavot, Law and the Shaping of Public Education 1785-1954 98
(1987).
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greater authority, capable of establishing population-wide mandates and reform, needed to be
at the helm. During this era, Massachusetts, Illinois, Nebraska, Michigan, Indiana, Wisconsin
and Oregon were states sufficiently emboldened to enact compulsory attendance laws. While
the stated purposes behind each enactment may have been different, each law demonstrated
the State’s increasing authority. Massachusetts sought to correct parental failures, protect
children, and curb child labor with the enactment of compulsory attendance laws.8 Illinois
pursued compulsory education as the vehicle to ensure that all children received a minimum
education.9 Nebraska wished to “…create an enlightened American citizenship in sympathy
with the principles and ideals of this country….”10 Oregon believed “the citizen must always
owe duties to the State…the State had an interest in making it certain that the citizen is fitted
in mind and body to perform these duties.”11 Compulsory attendance was viewed as a proper
“precautionary measure against the moral pestilence of paupers, vagabonds, and possibly
convicts.” 12

Wisconsin, through enactment of its compulsory education laws, hoped to

instill self-reliance and self-sufficiency and “to prepare citizens to participate effectively and
intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and independence:”13
“The requirement of compulsory schooling to age 16 must therefore be viewed as aimed not

8

M. S. Katz, A History of Compulsory Education Laws 19 (The Phi Delta Kappa Educational Foundation, 1976).

9

Chicago Bd. of Education v. Terrile, 47 Ill App. 3d 75 (1977).
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Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 395 (1923).
Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 528 (1925).
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New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 142 (1837)
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Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 221 (1972).
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merely at providing educational opportunities for children, but as an alternative to the equally
undesirable consequence of unhealthful child labor displacing adult workers, or on the other
hand, forced idleness.”14 North Carolina sought to “prepare citizens to participate effectively
and intelligently in our political system and to prepare individuals to be self-reliant and selfsufficient participants in society.”15
As the country transitioned into the Scientific Sorting Machine era the purpose of
education once again changed. Within the first two decades of the twentieth century, states
began to embrace their newfound authority, as evidenced by the establishment of compulsory
attendance laws in every state of the union. Industrialization, immigration, and international
conflict were significant considerations of this era when examining the purpose of
education.16 Compulsory school attendance was viewed as a way to combat child labor and to
remain globally competitive. In the era’s landmark Brown v. Board of Education decision,
declaring public school segregation unconstitutional, Chief Justice Warren described the
purpose of education as “a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment.” 17 However, despite reformers’ efforts during the preceding era, the United
States continued to be plagued by educational inequality.18 International influence propelled

14

15

Id. at 228.
Duro v. District Attorney, Second Judicial District of North Carolina, 712 F.2d 97 (1983).

16

Fowler, supra note 3, at 309.
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Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 ,493 (1954).

18

Fowler, supra note 3, at 311.
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the United States education system to adopt the practice of “tracking.” 19

Access to

educational programs and opportunities was generally controlled based on students’ race,
gender, socio-economic class, and special needs.20 This practice furthered achievement gaps
between students and resulted in school segregation.21 Parents essentially lost their authority
to educate their children, while simultaneously the bureaucratic presence in the educational
system grew exponentially. The upsurge in education-related litigation during this era was
indicative of the swelling dissatisfaction with the education system that emerged toward the
era’s end. All three seminal cases presented in this study were decided during this era and
reflected challenges to state governments’ increasing authority over education.
The purpose of education was again redefined with the emergence of the New
Paradigm era. “Public education is supported by a number of strong purposes, including
interests in democratic education, autonomy, empathy, creativity and imagination, respect and
tolerance, social skills, equality, and justice.” 22 These utopist purposes are trying to be
achieved, however, in the “No Child Left Behind”23 environment, where improved test scores
outweigh all other purposes. Student performance on standardized tests is viewed as the sole
19

Id. at 313.

20

Id. at 311.

21

Id. at 311.

22

Steven H. Shiffrin, Symposium: Children and Education: Tensions Within the Parent-Child-State Triad: The
First Amendment and the Socialization of Children: Compulsory Public Education and Vouchers, 11 Cornell
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 513 (2002).
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indicator of effective teaching and learning. The inordinate amount of time and energy
expended on test preparation leaves little room for any other education foci. Test scores alone
appear to have replaced the well-rounded educational purposes described by Shiffrin. As this
present era has progressed, palpable dissatisfaction with the education system is festering.
Communities have been confronted with economic woes (inflation and staggering
unemployment rates) and international unrest. Shift again. Students must now be prepared for
employment in a competitive, global, workplace while simultaneously meeting or exceeding
academic common core standards. The search for “a fix” that will solve all of education’s
challenges continues to be a relentless pursuit. In a seemingly desperate attempt to achieve
these purposes, rigorous, often contradictory, reform movements have been initiated, leaving
school districts struggling to understand, implement and fund these initiatives.

Historical Context and Prominent Values

Just as educational purpose and compulsory attendance laws are inextricably
intertwined, so too are historical events and values intertwined with educational purpose and
policy.

Fowler’s framework provides valuable insight into the prominent values that

impacted legislative and judicial decision making in each distinct era. As Fowler explains,
“Ideas, beliefs, and values are important for at least two reasons. First, they shape the way
people define policy problems….Second, ideas, beliefs, and values constrain people’s ability
to perceive possible solutions to policy problems.”24 Significant historical events and values
of the eras also provide the contextual backdrop for judicial discourse and decisions. While
24

Fowler, supra note 3, at 92.
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some information can be gleaned from written judicial opinions and dissents, it is difficult to
know exactly what was in the hearts and minds of the legislators and judges of long ago
without the benefit of direct access to policy makers and witnesses of the time.
Fowler’s description of the four basic values that have existed for centuries in the
United States clarifies the role of dominant values in the political arena and their impact on
education policy. Self-interest and others values, general social values, democratic values,
and economic values are present in each of the distinct era.25 Self-interest values focus solely
on the economic or power advancement of an individual or group, while others values focus
on commitments to existential principles.26 The thread of the general social values of order
and individualism, be it utilitarian or expressive, as well as the democratic values of liberty,
equality, and fraternity, are woven throughout the eras. 27

Economic values of growth,

efficiency and quality gain emphasis throughout the eras.28 As Fowler observes, “Americans
differ not in whether they believe in these values, but in how they prioritize them.” 29
Historical events directly impact the prioritization of values. Fowler suggests, “…all the
values cannot be pursued simultaneously with equal vigor.”30 Instead, she describes a cyclical
rotation of dominant values affecting education policy.31
25
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The Young Republic era was marked by Thomas Jefferson’s presidency, the
development of free trade, and the beginning of the industrial age.

Thomas Jefferson

recognized education was essential to self-government and democracy. His desire to ensure
the advancement of the American people (self-interest value) established the foundation for
the American education system. 32 Freedom and individualism values (general social and
democratic values) were natural byproducts of the Revolutionary War and the ensuing end of
British occupation. 33 America strived to be an entity unto itself, with minimal exchanges
between the United States and other parts of the world. The prioritization of the self-interest,
democratic and general social values was evident in the educational policy environment of
this era. Parents wanted the freedom to control the education for their children, with multiple
education options made available to them. Compulsion to attend school was not a priority,
especially in light of the ineffectiveness of the historic attempts, such as The Old Deluder,
Satan Law.

As this era came to a close, increased immigration and the dawn of

industrialization engaged the cyclical motion of dominant values.
The Rise of the Common Schools era was marked by the age of reformers (women’s
rights, anti-slavery, and religious freedom), a union of states shattered by division between the
industrial north and plantation south, the Civil War, and the creation of the railroad. A desire
for unity (democratic value) and order (general social value) pervaded, as America expanded

32
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33

Fowler, supra note 3, at 304.

77
within its own borders and internationally. 34 As the era progressed, compulsory school
attendance statutes increased. Government pursued social uniformity (democratic value),
rather than individualism (general social value), through the regulation of education.
Education was seen as the vehicle to instill values. Horace Mann, an educator and crusader
for education reform and decreased crime, believed, as did other reformers of the era, that
common schools were the key to unite an embattled populace divided ethnically, religiously,
and economically.35 Common schools provided common ground for diverse groups to come
together. As the Rise of the Common Schools era came to a close, America was attempting
its own reunification and attempting to position itself, through education, as a world power
(economic value). “The leaders of the period were convinced that education was a major
weapon for winning the international competition that was developing.” 36 An educated,
unified citizenry would allow the United States to establish economic and military might in
the face of its European competitors.37
The Scientific Sorting Machine era was characterized by extreme highs and lows. The
prosperity realized as a product of the progressive era and World War I was followed by the
Great Depression. These events contributed to the development of a sense of fraternity or
“norms of solidarity” (democratic value). 38

Extreme emotional reactions, teetering on

hysteria, pervaded during the World War II, Cold War, Civil Rights movement, and the
34

Id. at 307.

35

Id. at 306-307.

36

Id. at 308-309.

37

Id. at 308.

38

Id. at 98.

78
Vietnam War. Decreased fraternity resulted. America’s citizenry yearned for social change
and turned to the courts to address their growing dissatisfaction. Courts, through the issuance
of landmark judicial opinions, provided the vehicle for this change. The three compulsory
school attendance seminal court cases occurred during this era. The desire for efficiency
(economic value) and equality (democratic value) pervaded. Despite the multiple rights
movements of the era, equality continued to be unattainable. The parent-centered education
environment of the Young Republic era eroded to an environment in which parents possessed
virtually no authority to direct the education of their children. Increasing state authority and
international influence (economic value) contributed to another dominant value cycle.
The New Paradigm began with President Ronald Reagan’s crusade to reduce
government size and spending (economic value). Prosperity erupted during the early years of
the 21st century. The values of freedom (democratic value), individualism (general social
value) and choice that echoed after the Revolutionary War could once again be heard. This
prosperity did not last. Economic downturn, and its subsequent recovery, has since become
the cornerstone of the New Paradigm era. A return to general dissatisfaction with education
and rigorous education reform has occurred. “Freedom of choice” (democratic value) and
“excellence” (economic value) are at the heart of the education reform movement. 39

The

increase in global competitiveness (economic value), coupled with the fight against terrorism,
may provide the United States with an opportunity to reignite the “norms of solidarity” that
diminished during the previous era.

39

Id. at 316.
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Relevant Observations

With the magnitude and impact of the aforementioned historical events in mind, it is
important to consider that compulsory attendance statutes have existed for over 100 years in
each of the states referenced in this study.

Illinois, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Oregon,

Wisconsin, Michigan and Indiana enacted compulsory attendance statutes in the late 1800’s.
North Carolina, Iowa, and Tennessee enacted compulsory attendance statutes in the early
1900’s. This has legislative and judicial importance. While legislatively minor revisions
have been made to some school attendance statutes, the original statutory requirement,
namely compulsory attendance at school, has remained unaltered.

Unfortunately, the

conversation surrounding whether or not compulsory attendance laws are outdated fails to
make it to legislative floors. In Illinois, for example, legislative discourse continues to
surround application of the law, namely the age at which a child should be compelled to
attend school, as opposed to examining the law itself.

This legislative building block

approach to compulsory school attendance results in a tower that is so tall that the foundation,
too far from its peak, is weakened by its heavy burden. Modern-day legislators continue to
add to this tower.

Compelling school attendance for younger children exemplifies a

legislative pattern of adding more blocks.

This pattern of adding mandates and never

discarding or re-examining the foundation sets an unsustainable precedent. Utilizing Illinois
compulsory attendance to illustrate this phenomenon, school districts and communities
struggled to provide resources required to meet this mandate, even before the age range
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expanded.

The burden created by the revised, expanded legislation may simply be too much

for local school districts to absorb.
Judicially, only one legal case in this study (Concerned Citizens for Neighborhood
Schools, Inc. v. Board of Education) was decided within the same era in which compulsory
attendance laws were enacted in the state. As previously highlighted, the purposes and values
of education have changed significantly over time.

Judges must consider current legal

challenges to laws enacted in different eras. Specifically related to the cases relevant to this
study, the smallest span of years between enactment of a compulsory school attendance
statute and a judicial decision related to statutory challenge was 36 years (Meyer and Pierce).
The largest span between enactment of a compulsory school attendance statute and a judicial
decision relevant to a statutory challenge was 109 years (Hanson v. Cushman). All judicial
decisions presented in this study, with the exception of Meyer and Pierce, were decided more
than 50 years after the compulsory attendance statute was enacted within their state, a
majority of those with a span greater than 75 years. In order to illustrate the significance of
this, consider the following facts related to the cases presented in this study:


Of the twelve cases challenging compulsory attendance statutes enacted during the
Rise of the Common School era (1831-1900), all were decided by the courts in the
Scientific Sorting Machine era (1900-1982), with the exception of Mazanec, which
was decided in the New Paradigm era (1983-present).



Of the three cases challenging compulsory school attendance statutes enacted during
the Scientific Sorting Machine era, one challenge was decided in the same era; while
the others were decided in the New Paradigm era.
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When considering all decisions reached by lower and higher courts, approximately
twenty-one judicial outcomes favored the State and twelve favored the individual.



In Illinois, ten judicial decisions favored the State, while three favored the individual.



Lower court decisions favored the State in all but three cases.



Of the thirteen cases where challenges to compulsory attendance statutes were
considered by more than one court, the higher court overturned the lower court
decisions of six cases, resulting in five final decisions in favor of the individual and
one in favor of the State.



All higher court decisions in the New Paradigm era have favored, at least in part, the
State.

The historical context and values that existed during the Rise of the Common School era,
when the majority of the presented statutes were enacted, was substantially different than the
eras in which judges considered challenges to these laws. Judges have been asked to put a
square peg in a round hole. Values that existed at the time of compulsory school attendance
inception may no longer exist or be relevant. Decisions are made by looking back as opposed
to looking forward.
Finally, it is crucial to understand that while the judiciary has considered cases related
to compulsory school attendance, the three seminal cases considered by the United States
Supreme Court, and cited in subsequent lower court decisions, considered compulsory
attendance through the lens of the parental constitutional right to make educational decisions
for their children. All three United States Supreme Court decisions favored the individual,
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rather than the State. In light of the fact that education is not considered a fundamental right
under the United States Constitution, the United States Supreme Court considered how
compulsory school attendance statutes infringed the individual parental and student rights
guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Infringement of rights guaranteed by the First,
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments was the basis for compulsory attendance
challenges.

While considerations regarding the legitimacy or relevance of compulsory

attendance statutes were not considered by the United States Supreme Court, the states’
interest

in

regulating

the

education

of

its

citizenry

was

considered.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION
The notion of compelling formal education has been in existence since the 1600’s.
Subtle differences can be extrapolated from the compulsory school attendance statutes
enacted during the past four centuries; however, the core requirements have remained the
same. The study of compulsory attendance through the lens of Frances Fowler’s four distinct
eras reveals that each of Fowler’s eras carried its own social, economic, political, and cultural
values. Values of the eras likely impacted policy, legislative, and judicial decisions, but it is
unclear whether changing values have impacted compulsory attendance. The judiciary, when
making its compulsory attendance decisions, is tied to current law, legal precedents, and
constitutional considerations. Legislative hesitancy to revisit the relevancy of compulsory
attendance statutes in light of current values handcuffs the judiciary to statutes crafted based
upon century-old principles.

In the highly competitive domestic and international

environments that have emerged, the inability to reconsider old ideas and ways of being may
negatively impact our nation’s ability to be globally competitive.

The building block

approach exemplified by the compulsory attendance law history cannot be sustained as it is
defined today.
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While this study does not provide an answer to effectively manage staggering truancy
rates, decreasing graduation rates, increasing drop-out rates, academic achievement issues,
and financially unstable school districts, it does frame meaningful questions that may help
open a long-overdue compulsory school attendance dialogue.
First, should states compel school attendance? Does the United States citizenry,
including the myriad of education stakeholders, have the courage to revisit compulsory
attendance mandates, rather than simply building upon outdated, reactive laws? If the states
resolve to do so, it may be beneficial for education policy decisions to mirror technological
advances. Technology, while building upon core concepts, does not hesitate to discard
outdated, burdensome equipment. Mobile phones are an excellent example of technological
innovation that has been able to maintain its core value, accessible communication, while
discarding the old and introducing the new. The compulsory attendance statutes presented in
this study can be described as knee-jerk reactions to the social and economic issues of the eras
in which they were enacted.

Throughout previous eras, states have repeatedly chosen

retrofitting over reimagining. In essence, educational policy makers have refused to discard
the “bag phone” concept popular several decades ago, choosing to simply redesign the bag,
not the mobile device itself. Compulsory attendance laws have become so burdened with the
exterior design (application and enforcement) that proper consideration has not been given to
examining the best way to ensure the core value of ensuring an educated citizenry is met.
Proponents of compulsory school attendance throughout all eras cite similar reasons for
continued school attendance mandates, e.g., instilling American values, developing sound
character, preparing for employment, ensuring economic success, and securing democracy.
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Opponents throughout history argue compulsory attendance prolongs adolescence, contributes
to increased discipline issues at school, and limits innovation. Both arguments have merit.
Is it possible, with ingenuity and innovation, for education to be packaged and
delivered in a way that satisfies the needs of both proponents and opponents? Without losing
sight of its core value, is it time to reconsider the fundamental definition of compulsory
attendance? Compulsory attendance reflects a state’s desire to ensure its citizenry is educated
with a regulated curriculum, in a regulated amount of time, through regulated means, with
outcomes measured in a regulated manner. School districts, struggling to financially meet
these mandates and achieve these outcomes, seek creative, flexible solutions but are
imprisoned by rigid compulsory school attendance mandates. This dichotomy leads to the
inevitable vicious circle of “reformative” ideas that simply are a regurgitation of failed
innovations of a different era. The modern education movements toward “academies,” where
students select a preferred focus of study for their high school years (e.g., medical, business,
manufacturing, aviation, etc.) appear to be similar to the “tracks” of the Scientific Sorting
Machine era.

The desire to create a “draw” for students that will motivate improved

attendance and performance is admirable and, in fact, a sound approach to positively
impacting the issues facing today’s high schools. This initiative, however, may struggle like
so many before it if the rigid compulsory school attendance regulations are not examined and
redefined.
Should consideration, therefore, be given to making the Amish exemption the Amish
rule? Should students be compelled to attend school through the eighth grade only?
Proponents could argue such a rule would allow students to pursue continued education in the
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manner they see fit, either in traditional or non-traditional education environments. This
would decrease the financial burden to school districts and the communities trying to enforce
kindergarten through twelfth grade compulsory attendance mandates. Proponents might
further suggest if the American education system was better able to inspire life-long learners
in kindergarten through eighth grade, there would be no need to compel further education.
Opponents might argue such a plan is too risky. The costs associated with an impoverished,
under-educated citizenry could be higher than those associated with compulsory attendance
enforcement. There was no risk involved when the judiciary ruled in favor of the Amish in
Yoder, due to the fact the Amish would never access state assistance. If the Amish children
attended only through the eighth grade and became a burden, that burden would be absorbed
by the Amish community and not the state or federal government. While both sides have
merit, simply the dialogue about the merits of each would be tremendously beneficial to
rethinking current compulsory school attendance laws and policies.
Finally, are compulsory attendance policies in sync with the values of the time?
The ineffective, expensive, unsustainable compulsory attendance policies of today do not
reflect the dire circumstances of today’s education environment. It appears likely this course
will remain unaltered if legislators and educational leaders continue to rely on antiquated
mandates to deal with modern-day challenges. Until education is at the heart of education
policy decisions, no significant progress will be realized. “The dominance of the political
over educational concerns has been a relatively constant feature of most of the educational
reform initiatives since 1980.”1
1

Wayne J. Urban & Jennings L. Wagoner Jr., American Education: A History 391 (3rd ed. 2004).
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There exists a definitive progression in terms of compulsory school attendance. The
17th-century mandates compelling education were transformed into public education
mandates, which were later transformed into compulsory school attendance mandates.
Although the name may be different throughout history, the foundational principles of these
laws are the same that existed with the formation of The Old Deluder, Satan Law2. What
remains unclear is how long compulsory school attendance laws, based on values and
reactions to events long ago, will be allowed to continue to exist unaltered.

2

The Old Deluder Act (1647), in 2 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND 203 (Nathaniel B. Shurtleff ed., Boston, William White 1853),
available at http://personal.pitnet.net/primarysources/deluder.html.
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